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Subject Notebook XL I

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L4

Quote (continued from notebook X) from Sir Almroth E. Wright "Prolegomena to the Logic which Searches for Truth":

p. 58. ... "But, of course, unconfirmed judgments based on 'parasthodic evidence' should always (even though, many now and then, one of them might turn out to be true) be suspect.

"This logical point is brought out very humorously in a reported address by a colleague of mine to a lady who came to assist in the Out-patient Clinic of the Inoculation Department of Saint Mary's Hospital; and who, being a very honest woman, felt that she ought to make confession that she did not believe in inoculation. 'And me', replied my colleague, 'don't believe in believing'.

"On the other hand it is publicly taught from every pulpit that belief is a perfectly sure guide, and that anything that is intuited as true in religious speculation is as indubitably true as anything ascertained by the senses.

"But this is, apparently, given

[why split the section of the memory review so much about them of the memory? R.S.g.]

not only for popular acceptation. For every competent thinker must, when he retires into his 'pensive citadel', realize that nothing which is accepted only on the evidence of emotional visceral responses can be brought into serious comparison with that which is evidenced by the other senses.

"The following points may be adduced in corroboration of this.

p. 59. "First, there is the general point that data which are accepted 'paracathod-ically' can never be brought forward in evidence. This will come home to the reader when he considers that the only kind of witness he or any other reasonable man would be impressed with would be that of the one who had seen rambling (which was physical) with his own eyes, or had heard it with his own ears. And no sensible man would pay the least attention to a witness who avouched a thing to be true because he had either heard it said, or had read it in print. [But of the author's own assumptions as to his own existence or of the unity of natural forces, or his political beliefs. R.S.g.]

"The distinction between 'paraesthodic' and 'ortho-aesthodic belief' comes out very clearly in Scripture. It does so very conspicuously in two passages.

"One of these passages is that in which Job makes affirmation: 'I know' (this being paraesthodic visceral certitude) 'that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth, whom I shall see for myself' (this being ortho-aesthodic certitude) 'and mine eyes shall behold, and not another.'

"And the other passage which is witness to the inferiority of faith to the clarity of sight is that in which Saint Paul tells the faithful that the things which they now see 'in ambiguous vision, as in a mirror'

will by them in the afterlife be seen 'face to face'. 'Face to face' is, of course, an indirect way of expressing that which can now be more conveniently expressed by the adverb 'ortho-aesthodically'.

'Further, we may learn a lesson from the fact that the verb 'I believe' is used in the Creed to express a grade of certitude which would normally entitle a speaker to replace the verb 'I believe' by the verb 'I know'.

"And we have in the fact that the latter verb is not substituted for the former in the Creed further demonstration of the thesis that the believer does not regard the 'truths' of religion as isodynamous with those

attested by his senses.

Here is another difference: We saw in relation with the virtues of the senses that a single 'act of ortho-aesthesia belief suffices to establish a datum as true, and as true for all time.

(?) "On the contrary, 'paraesthesia beliefs' (and religious 'truths' in particular) are 'truths' which must always be kept up to the mark by reiterated [discipline] inward confirmation. Upon recognition of this psychological fact is founded St Paul's exhortation to believers 'not to forsake the assembling of themselves together.' And the Catholic Church is merely obeying the apostle's warning when she entreats all those who are in her fellowship that they must, regularly every Sunday, worship

them faith by attending Mass." ---

p. 62. --- "I pass now to consider the term realize. The verb is, as ordinarily used, only a more emphatic form of 'to believe' or 'to believe in'.

"But there is also a further point of difference. This lies in the fact that when we say we believe, we are interested more in the mental picture which occupies the screen of our mind, than in the reflex responses which are evoked in our viscera; while when we say we realize, we are interested less in the mental picture and more in the visceral responses. The following examples bring out both these points:

"When we have got to bed utterly tired out, we realize, we don't merely 'believe in', bed being a good place

'And when we have been watching sheep-dog trials, we realize, we don't merely 'believe in', the almost human intelligence of collie dogs.

"Also the devout realize, they don't merely believe in, 'the Divine Government of the Universe'. - - - - -

"And we now finally come to the question of the intellectual link between the notion of belief, and the notion of putting our trust in.

"The first point which invites attention here is that when a speaker says 'I believe', he may be thinking of the past and the present, but he is certainly not thinking of the future. When, on the contrary, he speaks of having faith in or putting his trust in, he is taking the future

into his reasonings.

"Further, we may note that those two notions – that of

p. 63. believing, and that of putting our trust in – are, though this is not always realized, absolutely distinct. We may of course, 'believe and trust'. But we have it on St James's authority that 'the devils also believe and tremble'.

"And in such case belief constitutes only the first act in the play; and there follows after it may be trust, but it may also be terror. And there may follow upon belief also attraction, or repulsion, love, or hatred.

"All these terminological difficulties come, I take it, in ultimate intent from the fact that

the Greeks had, as was indirectly intimated above, no word to describe the single elementary notion which is expressed by our word 'to believe' — that of 'apprehending as true'.

"That being so, the authors of the New Testament had when they wanted to express the simple notion of 'apprehending as true' to make use of the word πιστεύω, 'I trust'; and had then to tamper with it by linking it up with the prepositions εἰς and ἐπί.

"And what then emerged from this operation of word coining was not a word which expresses that which we are wont to mean by belief, (1) but a verbal formula which conveys the

(1) Why can't they make up their minds on a single assumption which you cannot prove.

double notion of "I BELIEVE', and 'I PUT MY FAITH IN'."

fortunate (1) ") find on going through the references in Cruden's Concordance that the term 'to believe' (or some paronym employed in its stead) is repeated to twenty-four times in the Old, and no less than two hundred and four times in the New Testament.

"And the Old and New Testament writers use the term quite differently. The former mean by believing:- relying on a man's good faith; while the New Testament writers nearly always mean by believing:- accepting the existence of that which is discountenanced by the

senses, and Trusting that Home":
[~~alone? RPsg~~] [Isn't that last word a misprint for alone? RPsg]
[These various passages all show the sense he has for religious. But he is all full of paradoxical belief himself, only he calls his own values. He believes he is superior to Indians & Yogis, presumably. RPsg]

His Gloss says
"Truth is distinguishable into two sorts: - (a) 'Physical Truth' - that which is certified to us by our senses; and (b) 'Conceptual or Abstract Truth' - the truth which is arrived at from valid premises by sound intellectual operations.

'Values' These may be distinguished into (a) Civic or Communal, and (b)

Transcendental Values.

p. VIII. "The essential point which is
recognized by the term 'values' is
that truth' is only one of the
targets of desire, and that everyone
who attends to what goes on in
the mind when the voices of the
outer world are hushed will
not only hear the call of truth,
but also that of a number of
other ideals."

Quote from Pearl Buck —
"Of Men & Women" — John Day, 1941

"Slaves develop great qualities
of character, endurance, philosophy,
diplomacy, humor, secret strength of
resistance, and the ability to keep
their own counsel even to the point

of slyness. Out of all this they learn to rule, and they gain, if they have any wits, the real ascendancy over their masters." [Also they learn non-violent resistance, a way RBG].

[The idea that jealousy is a resultant of an inferiority complex RBG]

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p. 115. "But the weak have no solidarity. Of many races, variously handicapped, they are a motley crowd. They have nothing in common except their weakness and their helplessness, and this is increased by their division. They do not often help each other. They try, each for himself, to win against the strong, or to insinuate themselves with the strong, hopeful each for his own benefit. And yet only in the

union of the weak can thus be any real strength. As it is now, the strong by their very strength are not ready for democracy, and the weak by their weakness are not ready for it.

"Thus in the United States neither man nor woman is ready for democracy — man by reason of his strength and woman by reason of her weakness." ~~Isabel says they are~~

p. 83. "Men and women are born free and equal in ability and brain. The injustice begins after birth. The man is taught that he must develop himself and work, lest he and his women starve. But the woman is taught merely to

develop such things or will plow the man but she starves because he does not want to feed her. Because of this insight, remembering fact, men have been the producers, rulers, and even the artists.

"For necessity makes artists too. Many a talent is born without its mate, energy, and so comes to nothing unless somehow energy is created to develop the talent. Necessity is the magic of this creation for the man: for if he has talent he will, if driven desperately enough, apply his compelled energy to his talent and become at least a fair artist - for genius still remains the combination of highest natural talent

and highest natural energy of
a quality which functions
without outside stimulus or
compulsion".

[Of sound diet as an aid
to energy & ∴ to ~~flowering~~ flowering
of talent & genius among a
people. It is the part of
environment which can be
controlled now]

"Truth can never be told so as
to be understood, and not be
believed." - Wm Blake.

Quotes from an essay on "Truth and Probability" by Frank P. Ramsey in the collection of his essays entitled "The Foundations of Mathematics". - Kegan Paul, London + Harcourt Brace + Co, N.Y. 1931.

p. 159. [After admitting for the sake of argument that the mathematical calculus of probabilities is in terms of frequencies, frequency distributions, a part of statistics]

... "But supposing all this admitted, it still remains the case that we have the authority both of ordinary language and of many great thinkers for discussing under the head of probability what appears to be quite a different subject, the logic of partial belief. It may be that, as some supporters of the frequency theory have maintained, the logic of partial

belief will be found in the end to be merely the study of frequencies, either because partial belief is definable as, or by reference to, some sort of frequency, or because it can only be the subject of logical treatment when it is grounded on experienced frequencies. Whether these contentions are valid can, however, only be decided as a result of our investigations into partial belief, so that I propose to ignore the frequency theory for the present and begin an inquiry into the logic of partial belief. ~~In this, I think, it will be most convenient if, instead of straight away~~

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p 169. -- "We have, therefore, to find a

process of addition for degree of belief, or some substitute for this which will be equally adequate to determine a numerical scale.

"Such is our problem: how are we to solve it? There are, I think, two ways in which we can begin. We can, in the first place, suppose that the degree of a belief is something perceptible by its owner; for instance that beliefs differ in the intensity of a feeling by which they are accompanied, which might be called a belief-feeling or feeling of conviction, and that by the degree of belief we mean the intensity of this feeling. This view would be very inconvenient, for it is not easy to ascribe numbers to the intensities of feelings; but apart from this it

seems to me observably false, for the beliefs which we hold most strongly are often accompanied by practically no feeling at all; no one feels strongly about things he takes for granted. [illegible]

"We are driven therefore to the second supposition that the degree of a belief is a causal property of it, which we can appreciate vaguely as the extent to which we are prepared to act on it. This is a generalization of the well-known view that the differentia of belief lies in its causal efficacy, which is dismissed by Mr. Russell in his Analysis of Mind. He there dismisses it for two reasons, one of

which seems entirely to miss the point. He argues that in the course of trains of thought we believe many things which do not lead to action. This objection is however beside the mark, because it is not asserted that a belief is an idea which does actually lead to action, but one which would lead to action in suitable circumstances; just as a lump of arsenic is called poisonous not because it actually has killed or will kill anyone, but because it would kill anyone if he ate it. Mrs. Russell's second argument is, however, more formidable. He points out that it is not possible to suppose that beliefs differ from other ideas only in their effects, for if they were otherwise identical their effects would be

p. 170.

identical also. This is perfectly true, but it may still remain the case that the nature of the difference between the causes is entirely known or very vaguely known, and that what we want to talk about is the difference between the effects, which is readily observable and important.

"As soon as we regard belief quantitatively, this seems to me the only view we can take of it. It could well be held that the difference between believing and not-believing lies in the presence or absence of introspectible feelings. But when we seek to know what is the difference between believing more firmly and believing less firmly,

we can no longer regard it as consisting in having more or less of certain observable feelings; at least I personally cannot recognise any such feelings. The difference seems to me to lie in how far we should act on these beliefs: this may depend on the degree of some feeling or feelings, but I do not know exactly what feelings and I do not see that it is indispensable that we should know. Just the same thing is found in physics; we found that a wire connecting plates of zinc and copper standing in acid deflected a magnetic needle in its neighborhood. According as the needle was more or less deflected the wire was said to carry a larger or a smaller current. The nature of this 'current' could only be conjectured; what was observed

and meaning were simply its effects.

"It will no doubt be objected that we know how strongly we
p 171 believe things, and that we can only know this if we can measure our belief by introspection. This does not seem to me necessarily true; in many cases, I think, our judgment about the strength of our belief is really about how we should act in hypothetical circumstances. It will be answered that we can only tell how we should act by observing the present belief-feeling which determines how we should act; but again I doubt the cogency of the argument. It is possible that what determines how we

should act determines us also directly or indirectly to have a correct opinion as to how we should act without its ever coming into consciousness.

"Suppose, however, I am wrong about this and that we can decide by introspection the nature of belief and measure its degree; still, I shall argue, the kind of measurement of belief with which probability is concerned is not this kind but is a measurement of belief as basis of action. This can, I think, be shown in two ways. First, by considering the scale of probabilities between 0 and 1, and the sort of way we use it, we shall find that it is very appropriate to the measurement of belief as a basis of action, but in no way related to the measurement of an

an interpreted feeling. For the units in terms of which such feelings or sensations are measured are always, I think, differences which are just perceptible: there is no other way of obtaining units. But I see no ground for supposing that the interval between a belief of degree 1/3 and one of degree 1/2 consists of as many just perceptible changes as does that between one of 2/3 and one of 5/6, or that a scale based on just perceptible differences would have any simple relation to the theory of probability. On the other hand the probability of 1/3 is clearly related to the kind of belief which would lead to a bet of 2 to 1, and it will be shown below how to generalize this relation so as to apply

to action in general. Secondly, the quantitative aspects of beliefs as the basis of action are evidently more important than the intensities of belief-feelings. The latter are no doubt interesting, but may be very variable from individual to individual, and their practical interest is entirely due to their position as the hypothetical causes of beliefs qua bases of action.

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"It is possible that someone would say that the extent to which we should act on a belief in suitable circumstances is a hypothetical thing, and therefore not capable of measurement. But to say this is merely to reveal ignorance of the physical sciences which constantly deal with and measure hypothetical quantities; for

instance, the electrical intensity at a given point is the force which would act on a unit charge if it were placed at the point.

"Let us now try to find a method of measuring beliefs as bases of possible actions. It is clear that we are concerned with dispositional rather than with actualized beliefs; that is to say, not with beliefs at the moment when we are thinking of them, but with beliefs like my belief that the earth is round, which I rarely think of, but which would guide my action in any case to which it was relevant.

"The old-established way of measuring a person's belief is to propose a bet,

and see what are the lowest odds which he will accept. This method I regard as fundamentally sound; but it suffers from being insufficiently general, and from being necessarily inexact. It is inexact partly because of the diminishing marginal utility of money, partly because the person may have a special eagerness or reluctance to bet, because he either enjoys or dislikes excitement or for any other reason, e.g. to make a book. The difficulty is like that of separating two different cooperating forces. Besides, the proposal of a bet may inevitably alter his state of opinion; just as we could not always measure electric intensity by actually introducing a charge and seeing what force it was subject to, because the

introduction of the change would change the distribution to be measured.

173 "In order therefore to construct a theory of quantities of belief which shall be both general and more exact, I propose to take as a basis a general psychological theory which is now universally discarded, but nevertheless comes, I think, fairly close to the truth in the sort of cases with which we are most concerned. I mean the theory that we act in the way we think most likely to realize the objects of our desires, so that a person's actions are completely determined by his desires and opinions. This theory cannot be made adequate to all the facts, but it seems to me a useful

approximation to the truth particularly in the case of our self-conscious or professional life, and it is presupposed in a great deal of our thought. It is a simple theory and one which many psychologists would obviously like to preserve by introducing unconscious desires and unconscious opinions in order to bring it more into harmony with the facts. How far such fictions can achieve the required result I do not attempt to judge: I only claim for what follows approximate truth, or truth in relation to this artificial system of psychology, which like Newtonian mechanics can, I think, still be profitably used even though it is known to be false.

"It must be observed that this theory

is not to be identified with the psychology of the Utilitarians, in which pleasure had a dominating position. The theory I propose to adopt is that we seek things which we want, which may be our own or other people's pleasure, or anything else whatever, and our actions are such as we think most likely to realize these goods. ---- [Then follows a bit of symbolic logic & math] ----

p. 182. "We find, therefore, that a precise account of the nature of partial belief reveals that the laws of probability are laws of consistency, an extension to partial beliefs of formal logic, the logic of consistency. They do not depend for their meaning on any degree of belief in a proposition

being uniquely determined as the rational one; they merely distinguish those sets of beliefs which obey them as consistent ones.

Having any degree of belief implies a certain measure of consistency, namely willingness to bet on a given proposition at the same odds for any stakes, the stakes being measured in terms of ultimate values. Having degrees of belief obeying the laws of probability implies a further measure of consistency, namely such a consistency between the odds acceptable on different propositions as shall prevent a book being made against you.

Some concluding remarks on this section may not be out of place. First, it is based fundamentally on betting,

but this will not seem unreasonable when it is seen that all our lives we are in a sense betting. When we go to the station we are betting that a train will really run, and if we had not a sufficient degree of belief in this we should decline the bet and stay at home. The options God gives us are always conditional on our guessing whether a certain proposition is true.

Secondly, it is based throughout on the idea of mathematical expectation; the dissatisfaction often felt with this idea is due mainly to the inaccurate measurement of goods. Clearly mathematical expectations in terms of money are not proper guides to conduct. It should be

remembered, in judging my system, that in it value is actually defined by means of mathematical expectation in the case of beliefs of degree 1/2, and so may be expected to be scaled suitably for the valid application of the mathematical expectation in the case of other degrees of belief also. - - - - - - -

p. 187. --- "We saw at the beginning of this essay that the calculus of probabilities could be interpreted in terms of classification; we have now found that it can also be interpreted as a calculus of consistent partial belief. It is natural, therefore, that we should expect some intimate connection between these two interpretations, some explanation of the possibility of applying the same mathematical

calculus to two such different sets of phenomena. Nor is an explanation difficult to find; there are many connections between partial ~~[illegible]~~ beliefs and frequencies. For instance, experienced frequencies often lead to corresponding partial beliefs, and partial beliefs lead to the expectation of corresponding frequencies in accordance with Bernoulli's theorem. ---

p. 191 --- "We found that the most generally accepted parts of logic, namely, formal logic, mathematics, and the calculus of probabilities, are all concerned simply to ensure that our beliefs are not self-contradictory. We put before ourselves the standard of consistency and construct these

elaborate rules to ensure its observance. But this is obviously not enough; we want our beliefs to be consistent not merely with one another but also with the facts: nor is it even clear that consistency is always advantageous; it may well be better to be sometimes right than never right. Nor when we wish to be consistent are we always able to be: there are mathematical propositions whose truth or falsity cannot as yet be decided. Yet it may humanly speaking be right to entertain a certain degree of belief in them on inductive or other grounds: a logic which proposes to justify such a degree of belief must be prepared actually to go against formal logic, for to a formal

truth formal logic can only assign a belief of degree 1. We could prove in Mr. Keynes' system that its probability is 1 on any evidence. This point seems to me to show particularly clearly that human logic or the logic of truth, which tells men how they should think, is not merely independent of but sometimes actually incompatible with formal logic."

Axioms of geometry are ~~of~~ to ~~be~~ based on or derived from innate ideas a/c to one school, or experience a/c to another. [article on Science in Encycl. Brit 14th ed.]

Scientific method consists of a combination of observation, hypothesis, [mathematical] deduction, and confirmation

experiment (verification). (Some article in Engel. Bint

Article thesis on scientific method states that there are the mental activities therein involved :- observation (including experiment), analysis and synthesis, imagination, supposition and idealization, inference (deductive and inductive), and comparison (including analogy). These are used in the pursuit of every kind of knowledge & so do not constitute scientific method. The methods of science are several. e.g. classification the evolutionary or genetic method, methods for discovering causal connection the statistical method.

"I am Persuaded" by Julian Duguid,
Jonathan Cape, London 1941.

Notes: "How many cry out to be spared (from death), yet are bowed by one evening at ~~Expo~~ home?" p. 139

p. 168. (Re kind helpfulness of skeptics)

"He has only one rule in these matters, but that has an iron unrelentingness. The sufferer must come to him.

"It is inspiring to notice how parallel, within certain obvious limits, are the paths of Jesus and the agnostic. Many later followers of Jesus, unobservant of his wise technique, are much less deft with humanity than are those who do not believe. Enthusiasm makes intelligence, and then they wonder why nobody loves them. It is an acrid lemon

in humility; for between Jesus and the moping Christian there is a gap wider and more formidable than between Jesus and the reasonable skeptic. ---

"Jesus was detached from ambition. He saw the clogging folly of wealth, the transient bloom of the flesh. He was merciless to human hypocrisy, which is often enough unconscious, and hated pompous rectitude, the fat, unbearable dullness of the well-entrenched. He knew the stink of corruption behind uninterrupted respectability. ---

p. 170. ~~"Jesus was humble because he was~~

"It is in this handling of humanity, however, that the technique is so startlingly alike. Jesus did not peer into corners. He did not go searching for the wicked and tell them they were doing

into Hell. He stormed at the Scribes and ~~Phar~~ Pharisees, but never as individuals: simply as organizations which had unfruitful ways of thought. To Nicodemus, the only Pharisee whose name is mentioned, He was courteous, explanatory and logical. Publicans, harlots and sinners were not rudely expelled from his society unless they promised to reform. They were welcome to speak to him in public; He felt no dishonour in their company. Yet, it was only when they cried for help, when they compared their lives to His and were suddenly, horribly shaken, that He lifted a finger to remodel them. In fact he did not remodel them. He allowed his creative power to assist them to change

themselves. From one end of the New Testament to the other there is no single record of a penance.

172. "When Jesus refrained from interfering it was from a knowledge of humanity so deep that it escapes the average reader. If one believes that death is not the end, and that the soul is judged on her merits, it needs superhuman control not to move into a friend's affairs. We think we see him slipping to perdition: we long to save him from a folly which, quite obviously, will bring him pain. We muddle through sheer good-heartedness and a desire to preserve him from agony. We are sure that, if only he will follow our wise and disinterested advice, his path towards Heaven will be rose-un-

naturally bereft of them.

"It is a situation which shows us as we are, vain, blind and experimentally foolish, without faith in the ultimate good.

"For the majestic truth is this: every man is entitled to his sins. They are the greatest teachers in the world and, unless we experience the whips, we never learn anything at all. To hinder a friend in an error which he is determined to carry through is like ignoring a child from memorizing the multiplication table. The father of the Prodigal Son did not forbid the wallowing: he even gave him his inheritance to squander. He was content to stand in the background.

ground until the boy, of his own accord, was ready to be welcomed home.

"The first great rule of Christianity is the first rule of behaviour. Understand your neighbor as yourself and, for God's sake, mind your own business. Your knowledge and kindness will be needed when the husks have grown stale and intolerable." - - -

p. 199. "A person who begs for enlightenment, as opposed to some concrete aid, is not sent away empty. Once he has inquired the path where 'all things needful are added unto him' he feels as though he walks in company. I do not know how or why these outside events occur to him; and the angle of superstition is not a fair point for the jury. The mathematics of coincidence are irrelevant

beside the one certain fact that improbable things begin to happen to those who ask in humility. This is what Jesus promised, with a warning against falling among thorns; and this is what actually takes place. Since the materialist has never availed himself of the offer which Jesus made, he is not entitled to an opinion. Intellectually, he is in the position of a chemist who denies the result of an experiment without bothering to mix the ingredients."

p. 215. [The fact that a cat's digestion stops when she is frightened or shown by X rays, shows that animals do not live in terror. They would starve in a week if that were the case].

p. 127. "'Ask and it shall be given you' is not a religious text, as we narrowly understand religion. It is a promise to all mankind, the principle of all free will, and may be used for any purpose. It will buy gold, mistresses and mansions.; or a knowledge of the peace of God. Both foolish and wise may employ it, though for a different number of years and with dangerously different consequences. It may lead to an inner garden so impregnable that chaos is disarmed; and to the dark corridors of the madhouse. It is the process of cleaning one's room from the jumble of negative thoughts. After the vacuum cleaner has done its work the guests are invited in.

It is an intimate personal choice whether one asks creativeness to the table or admits the seven devils. One cannot, however, live alone."

p. 229. "Sin is energy applied to foolish ends."

252. [The idea of god as a power home a being connected with him by a wire whose current we can map out]

"Among other things it taught me that a sparrow may not fall to the ground unheeded. My mind is a spark of the eternal, of the force which holds the balance. at death, this spark vanishes. It is not a conscious flame, but it is no less real for that. And even a Corporation power-house is aware of

what light is being used." ---

p. 245 --- "The point is that prayer is not religious, though it may be used religiously. It is a feat of mental ~~skill~~ athletics and may be turned to thousands of ends." ---

281 "Each one of us has hidden within him the volcano-crater of crime. We are apt to think ourselves innocent if we avoid that part of a thought which is visible in physical action. We admit that hatred breeds murder, but deny our kinship with killers when rage envelops us in mist. It is evolution to state which is lacking, not absence of the will to wound." Again, society abhors prostitution; but the author who plagiarizes himself through twenty

identical books, a politician who trims his sails to the whisper of an ebby from the city, a man who sells his convictions for influence, power or bread, have an honored place in life. If these examples were figures of speech then abduction, murder, rape and arson would not touch our minds at all. ---

"The hard truth is this: we cannot begin to crawl free from the primeval ooze inside us until we confess with humility:

"'I have killed, I have adored, I have stolen.'

"When that happens, temptation is half-conquered -- but we can no longer enjoy the judgment seat."

p. 289. "This power is latent and manifest in every stone, bird, fish, gas, tree, pool, man and beast that has ever existed on this planet or anywhere else in space. It can be changed in obedience to law. Its constituents can be chopped and rearranged. It can be canalized and often directed. ----

"It seems to me blind in the extreme to confuse manifestations with power. --"On this showing, all material things are the battlements of ideas. In religious or poetic language, we are thoughts in the mind of God. And, since the force is too immense to be embraced, since it can only be approached by the emotions, which cannot be pinned to words, there is no intellectual shame in calling

it our own Heavenly Father."

p. 335b. [After pointing out that in the realm of living creatures up to man, competition & selfishness prevails & yet that man helps the weak instinctively) -- the finest men of all are those who follow this impulse. What possible biological need is served by the rescue of the wounded? In the forest, they are left to die so that the race may increase in vigor. I suggest that this single argument is more valuable than psychic evidence in support of the theory of survival. I suggest that, while nature is logical in all the lower instincts, it is foolish to assume that she has wavered in her

supreme accomplishment, man. I suggest that her ultimate aim is union with the individual through the ladder-climbing power of love. If this is not the case, then the whole universe is incredible, since on every other plane there is law."

He suggests the idea on some page that God is vastly beyond our understanding in any way but since personality is the highest point in evolution in this world to date, we feel God's power + presence as if he were a person. Hence to call him Father is valid language even though we do not mean he is a human person or interviews in nature as

if he were.

p. 233. "The story of Alladin is as true as the parable of Eden, eternally topical to mankind. ...

"Alladin, it will perhaps be remembered, went down into the earth for his lamp. He crawled through a narrow passage until he reached the magic garden, where the trees were heavy with jewels. The slave who appeared at the rubbing of the lamp inquired his masters pleasure, which he obeyed without question or difficulty. The fact that Alladin wanted palaces, while I wanted knowledge of life, is neither here nor there. Both asked and both received.

" the garden symbolizes that part of us which lies deep below the surface. It is the emotional, instinctive, subliminal or subconscious sphere, which has been referred to in this book as the thalamus. It is the realm of the Kingdom of Heaven, to which God or even devils may be invited according to the will of the cortex. More often, it is simply shocked with horror. Of it, Rabindranath Tagore writes in the 28th poem of Gitanjali: 'I am certain that priceless wealth is in thee, and that thou art my best friend, but I have not the heart to sweep away the tinsel that fills my room. The shroud

that covers me is a shroud of dust and death. I hate it, yet hug it in love.'' ...

"A man who works selflessly for others without desire for [illegible] a tangible reward inherits the country unstintingly. Its landscape comes out in his face. The turned to the garden is humility, the merging of the personal pronoun in something that is bigger than himself."

Quote from C. J. Bernard, "Theory of Modern Pine Systems" S. Orange, N.J. 1941.

p. 31. "Concerning cause and effect reasoning, its fallacy (except under careful qualifications) I have little time to go into.

Its alternative is called 'functional' reasoning (Hermann Weyl) 'schedule' or 'pattern' or 'administrative' reasoning (by myself), 'multi-dimensional' reasoning (by Karl Mannheim). Our everyday language is unfortunately a 'cause and effect' language which is one reason why business men so persistently misrepresent how their minds really work. I attempted (inadequately) to bridge the gap in my book in the chapter ('The Theory of Opportunism') by calling what most people call 'cause' 'strategic factor', a term which I borrowed from John R. Commons. Perhaps you do not know that 'cause and effect' are abandoned in physics. For example, H. Margenau (Phil. of Science, vol 1, p. 135-6) says: 'There is no law of connection between cause and

effect known to science; moreover these concepts are foreign to physical analysis.' I could find statements of P.W. Bridgman ('The assumption of the principle of causality is not necessary to thought because physicists have been doing valid thinking without it.' The Intelligent Individual and Society, p. 35) and others of the same character.

p. 32 --- "The proper comprehension of such systems of prices, as is true of systems of administration, of complex organizations, of physical and chemical ~~organizations organ~~ systems and organisms, requires a technique of ~~a differen~~ thought of a different type than is convenient when it has been proved by experience

feasible to treat the simple correlation of two factors as if it were independent of numerous others. The latter type, which characterizes ordinary cause and effect reasoning, is, however, well adapted to the ordinary behavior of each of us in ordinary and customary circumstances and is the type to which our language is specifically adapted. The only language suitable for dealing with systematic interrelationships of complexity is mathematics, which is not adapted to the treatment or description of qualitative factors except in the most highly abstract degree. Hence, not only in the particular field of economics, but in other social fields, we are confronted with

the perpetual dilemma of using language inadequate to our problems but suitable for routine and individual purposes. Upon the basis of thinking in terms of an unsuitable language we are continually constructing generalizations or false judgments that conflict with the understanding and behavior of those whose duty it is to plan complex systems. This dilemma in my opinion underlies much of the serious conflict of our world, which is a good reason for giving it sympathetic attention.

"Should you have difficulty in grasping the sense of systems of interdependent variables, you may ... some time be able to look up

Dr. L. J. Henderson's little book on Pareto's Sociology, especially the appendices, in which you will find both mechanical and chemical illustrations involving no more mathematics or chemistry than you have had. An excellent more philosophical approach to the multi-dimensional type of thought is in Karl Mannheim's valuable 'Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction' pp 147-155 and 164-173."

"Only a country which can accept defeat is worthy of victory" - Mary Gamble in Peace News July 4, 1941. G. Kipling' - Come meet with Triumph and disaster and treat those two impostors just the same."

Quotes from B. Russell - "An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth" - W. W. Norton & Co. -

p. 38. --- "To speak for the moment in terms of physics, we give proper names to certain continuous stretches of space-time, such as Socrates, France, or the moon." ---.

131. "Science consists largely of devices for inventing concepts having a greater degree of precision than is found in the concepts of every day life".

135. --- "No egocentric particulars occur in the language of physics. Physics views space-time impartially, as God might be supposed to view it, there is not, as in perception, a region which is specially warm and intimate and bright. .... There can be no

question that the non-mental world can be fully described without the use of egocentric words. Certainly a great deal of what psychology wishes to say can also dispense with them. Is there, then, any need for these words at all? Or can anything be said without them? ["now" is an egocentric word]

134. -- "All egocentric words can be defined in terms of 'this'. Thus 'I' means 'The biography to which this belongs'; 'here' means 'The place of this'; 'now' means 'The time of this'; and so on. We may therefore confine our inquiry to 'this'. It does not seem equally feasible to take some other egocentric word as fundamental, and define 'this' in terms of it. Perhaps if we gave a name to 'I-now', as opposed to 'I-

Then' this name could replace 'this';
but no word of common speech seems
capable of replacing it."

142- "For reasons which will appear more
fully in later chapters, I think that
the phrase 'I am' can always be
replaced by the phrase 'this is' or
vice versa. Which of the two phrases
we use depends upon accident or pre-
judice. We say "I am hot' rather
than 'this is hotness', if we are hot
from exercise and not because of the
surrounding temperature. But when
we go into the engine-room of a ship,
we say 'ouf! it is hot here', which
is equivalent (roughly) to 'this is
hotness' We say 'this is a cat',
and intend to make a statement
about something which is not merely

a part of our own biography. But if the word 'this' is to apply, as it should, to something that we directly experience, it cannot apply to the cat as an object in the outer world, but only to our own percept of a cat. Thus we must not say, 'this is a cat', but 'this is a percept such as we associate with cats', or 'this is a cat-percept'. This phrase, in turn, can be replaced by 'I am cat-perceptive', which asserts a state of myself, and is true on exactly the same occasions as those on which I am tempted (readily) to say 'this is a cat', and on which I am justified in saying 'this is a cat-percept'. What we directly know when we say 'this is a cat' is a state of ourselves, like being hot.

"This is every statement containing 'this' we may substitute 'what I-now notice'; and in every statement containing 'I-now' we may substitute 'what is congruent with this'.

"It follows that what has been said of 'this' applies equally to 'I-now'; what distinguishes 'I-now' from a proper name is no part of what is stated by a sentence containing 'I-now', but is only an expression of the causal relation between what is stated and the stating of it:

--- "So far as our present problem is concerned it is sufficient to notice that 'you' is always determined by relation to some present percept which at the moment is

'this'. Consequently the explanation of 'this' also explains 'you', in so far as the difficulty is that of egocentric particulars." ----

p 150 ... "We may put the matter schematically as follows: A certain experience E (e.g. that which is the visual core in what we call 'seeing a cat') has, in my previous history, been usually closely accompanied by certain other experiences. Hence, by virtue of the law of habit, the experience E is now accompanied by what Hume would call 'ideas', but what I should prefer to call 'expectations', which may be purely bodily states. In any case, these expectations deserve to be called 'beliefs' as we shall find later

when we come to analyze belief.
Thus while the sensory core is
151 not cognitive, its associative accom-
paniments, being beliefs, must be
classed as cognitions (including
possibly erroneous beliefs under
this head). If this view seems
odd, that is because we tend to
think of belief in an unduly
intellectualist fashion.

" I do not like to use the word
'perception' for the complete experi-
ence consisting of a sensory core
supplemented by expectations,
because the word 'perception' sug-
gests too strongly that the
beliefs included are true. I will
therefore use the words 'perceptive
experience'. ---

239. "'Belief', we decided, is a certain condition of mind and body, not essentially involving words. ---

261 "The one word 'belief' should, I think, be replaced by several. First, perception, memory, expectation. Next come habit-inferences, of the kind that Hume considers in connection with causation. Last come deliberate inferences such as logicians sanction or condemn. ~~It is~~ [all this may be strengthened or caused by meditation &c.] [Mud.]

It is necessary to distinguish these in our present discussion, because they produce different states of the believer. Suppose I am a dictator, and at 5 P.M. on October 22 some one attempts to stab me with a dagger. As a result of reports by the secret police,

I believe that this is going to happen; this is (or at least may be) a logically inferential belief; it may also be a belief produced by habit-inference. At 4:59 I see a known enemy taking a dagger from its sheath; at this moment I expect the assault. The inference to the immediate future is now not logical but habitual. A moment later, the assassin rushes forward, the blade pierces my coat, but is stopped by the shirt of chain armour that I wear next the skin. At this instant, my belief is a matter of perception. Subsequently, the villain having been beheaded, I have the experience of 'motion recollected

in tranquility', and my belief has become one of memory. It is obvious that my bodily and mental state is different on these four occasions, though what I am believing is the same throughout, in the sense that it can be indicated in the same words, viz: 'I believe that at 5 P.M. on October 22 an attempt is made to stab me with a dagger'. ['This' is' here is timeless, not the present tense; it is like the 'is' in '4 is twice 2'].''

Quotes from A.E. Taylor "Philosophical Studies", Macmillan, 1934, the essay on "Knowing & Believing";

p.382. -- "I hope I need not say that I have not the slightest quarrel with the doctrine that the prima axiomata are disclosed to us by 'induction', if only the nature of the induction is rightly understood. The all-important point is not that this induction is not proof of any kind. We do not 'prove' such an 'axiom' by an enumeration of particular instances; we see it, or as Aristotle says, 'recognize' it in the particular instance, and this recognition is direct and immediate."

~~(This is the explanation of the fact, found so mysterious by Hall, that one~~

p. 394 --- "Our human thought, always, as the phrase is, 'discursive', advances from point to point, or, as the schoolmen said, proceeds by composition and division, that is - judgments, affirmative and negative about, or upon, a material not itself apprehended by judgment. We have perception for judgment the moment we begin to recognize, to reflect and to communicate the results of recognition and reflection; nothing able to complete an 'infinite analysis', we never return, at the other end of the process, to the kind of apprehension we are seeking, a vision which has the directness of perception without its particularness. And, as I take it, the ultimate reason why this must be so is the simple one that time and movement are as radically characteristic of our thinking as

they are of the processes of physical life. Thinking and judging are what so far as I can see, complete knowledge cannot be, temporal processes. Our attempt to say what knowledge is leads us back to a conviction which we may equally reach along very different lines, the conviction that time is at the bottom of our profoundest and most perplexing metaphysical problems." - -

p. 396 "Let me, in conclusion, try to put together, in a set of theses, the results of these rather desultory reflections.

(1) Knowing and believing are two quite distinct attitudes of a mind to that which it apprehends. Knowing is not a special way of believing, nor believing a special

way of knowing.

(2) The difference between the two attitudes is not one which can be discerned in an individual case by observational scrutiny, and is, in this sense, not psychological, and cannot be justified by an empirical science of psychology.

(3) Nor does it lie in the fact that what is known is true, since this may equally be the case with what is believed, but not known

(4) The reality of "sensitive" or "historical" knowledge shows that the difference cannot be simply that the object of knowledge is non-temporal.

(5) Yet the difference must lie somehow in the respective

Characters of that which is believed and that which is known.

(6) What the difference is seems to be indicated by the consideration that perception affords knowledge, though a knowledge, which is inarticulate and incommunicable. Belief is a sub-species of judgement and judgement is mediate, in the sense that it presupposes reference to grounds for judging which fall outside the judgement itself. This is not the case with knowledge.

(7) The ideal of knowledge is that it should be at once immediate and articulated. In actual life, the immediacy

is most manifest in perceptional knowledge, where articulation is at a minimum. The articulation is clearly manifest in scientific knowledge, as conceived by Aristotle, where conclusions are known along with and through premises which are, in the last resort, themselves immediately apprehended. But, even in the case where such scientific knowledge is best exemplified, that of pure mathematics, the whole of the premises relavent to the conclusion are not consciously envisaged in the act of "knowing the conclusion through its premises." Hence the ideal

of knowledge is not actually attained even here, since the apprehension is not full and complete "vision".

(8) It follows that while Aristotle was justified in his demand for "intuitive apprehension of unproved premises of demonstration", his account of knowledge is defective at the other end by not explicitly recognizing the reality of the inarticulate and incommunicable knowledge belonging to sense-perception as such..

(9) The impossibility of limiting knowledge to awareness of the universal, thus implicitly ~~recognizing the reality of the~~

denying that historical fact can be known, arrises directly from the fundamentally temporal and successive character of human mental activities, not from the nature of knowledge itself.

I would add two corollaries to these theses:

(1) It is unfortunate that some eminent recent philosophers should have spoken habitually of logic as concerned with judgements rather than with propositions. This language inevitably tends to obliterate the very real distinction between knowing & believing by the

misleading suggestion that knowing is a kind of "cogitation".

(2) Since knowledge, so far as it really is knowledge, is immediate, there can be no "theory of knowledge" in the sense of a theory of the way in which knowing is done. The whole of what can properly be called "theory of knowledge" is contained in an answer to the question "How does knowing differ from opining and believing?" And the true answer to this question can be given in three words, "By being vision."

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p. 379. "As both Plato and Aristotle saw, the identification of knowledge

proper with awareness of demonstrations at once raises the question about the status of the 'first principles' of demonstration, the ultimate major premises of knowledge. Do we know these premises or do we not? Obviously if we know them, it cannot be by demonstration. If we have said that no one knows the conclusion of a demonstration unless he has first demonstrated its premises and the premises which have been used in demonstrating them, we should be making all knowledge depend on an infinite analysis, and thus, in effect, denying that a 'creature' can know anything. If we say that the ultimate premises are not known but only believed, we should have to admit that this defect in

our cogitation of the premises affects the whole superstructure which is built on them, and so, once more, there would be no genuine knowledge

p. 280. "We do not really escape this difficulty by pointing out, what is true enough, that in mathematics, the type of strictly demonstrable knowledge, it is not the ultimate postulates, but only the implications of further consequence by the postulates, that is formally asserted. The difference, we are sometimes told, between the modern philosophical mathematicians and his less cautious predecessors is that the predecessors asserted both a conclusion, such as the Pythagorean theorem, and the various more ultimate postulates from which the demonstration /

the theorem is born.

"Man & Society in an Age of Reconstruction"
by Karl Mannheim. - Harcourt Brace & Co.
1941.

Re "multi-dimensional" thinking (p 164)
footnote he says "Frank H. Knight's
"Rationalism and Economic Thought" in
his Ethics of Competition (New York, 1923 1926)
contains many penetrating remarks on
this subject.

"Consider the Lilies How They Grow"
by John Joseph Stoudt 2 vols.
An Interpretation of the Symbolism of
Pa German Art. 1937. Publ.
Pa German Folklore Society. Printed
at Schlechter's - Allentown, Pa.

John J. Stoudt - 1054 Tenghman St
Allentown, Pa.; & Pendle Hill

Student who - doing a thesis on Amish agric. practices at U of P under Rutland Shryock is Grant Stallfuss, Elverson, Pa

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Quotes from "The Impulse to Dominate" by D. W. Harding - allen & Unwin, London 1941 -

p. 19. "But the nature of self-assertion and self-submission needs to be looked at more closely. They are relationships which occur only when differences arise - differences of opinion, intention, judgment, taste, and so on. The people concerned may, of course, simply 'agree to differ';

they insulate themselves from each other on that particular point. But if they wish to maintain close social contact (as they must, for instance, if they are to coöperate in a piece of work), they must reach agreement. Each, perhaps, must give way a little. The self-assertive or dominative person is one who expects that in such a case he will give way less than the other.

Incidentally we must note that self-assertion is not achieved solely by force. Affectionate relationships permit it equally. The unspoken threat of withdrawing affection, besides various other forms of emotional bullying, is quite as effective as forcible domination. But whether force or affection is used the result is the same, in that

agreement is reached either because one person submits totally or because both make partial submission.

"One-sided and extreme forms of this relationship are found in the submission of slave to master, where force is the ultimate sanction, and of child to parent, where affection plays a large part. Such social relationships as these certainly offer many satisfactions. But in most people's view they are not the finest development of social life. Companionship with equals gives greater satisfactions. Agreement given by an equal is more gratifying than the submission of child, servant, or subordinate. It is more gratifying because he was

perfectly free to oppose you. The agreement
20) of an equal takes the form: 'Why, yes, of
course; I see now that you're right'; the
submissive associate is too prone to say
in effect: 'Well, I don't quite see it, but
no doubt you're right.'

"How to have his associate genuinely free to disagree with him without discomfort is not characteristic of the self-assertive person. Disagreement with him is apt to cause some cooling or some rift in the social relationship. Even if he permits the disagreement it is not genuinely welcome. To welcome disagreement means exposing oneself to change, and to many people that seems hazardous. They must hang on to their own individuality at all costs.

As the Suttles (1933) have pointed out, 'by death an adult means loss of individuality.' It follows that differences of outlook in other people, which invite us to change ourselves, cannot be positively welcomed unless we feel secure - that is, unless we feel that there is so wide a margin of safety between ourselves and psychological disintegration that we can assimilate great changes of outlook without fear of losing our individuality.

"But welcoming the opportunity which differences present does not mean mere submission either. The submissive posture is not developing the full possibilities of a social situation

any more than the assertive one. He aims almost exclusively at agreement and harmony. By putting the emphasis there, instead of asking whether what they agree about is satisfactory in itself, he too emasculates the social situation and diminishes its possibilities. He makes harmony too easy to mean anything. He may be as docile as a weathercock, and still his personality will not really change, for its permanent structure actually consists, to a great extent, in this dependent agreement with the forceful personality of the moment. On the other hand his docility may be sham and his submission only lip-service for the sake of peace and quiet. If so he is in effect withdrawing his

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individuality, inviolate and unchanged, from the social situation. He is merely a would-be dominative person frustrated. And this type of person also diminishes the social possibilities, depriving both himself and his associate of the opportunity given in equal ~~comradeship~~ companionship.

"True equality in a social contact was implied in the idea of 'primitive comradeship' put forward by F. C. Bartlett (1923). He explicitly rejected Mr Dougal's view that all social responsiveness fell into the pattern of domination and submissiveness. He had in mind, however, mainly teamwork and other forms of co-operation where there is a difference

of function between those who take part but where they already have a common aim. But non-dominative behaviour is conceivable even when differences of aim and outlook arise between two people. This possibility has been expounded by H.H. Anderson, an American psychologist who has made studies of the social behaviour of young children. Taking the view that domination and submission are only obverse and reverse of the same social relationship, he looks for an alternative, a genuinely different, relationship. This he finds in what he calls 'social integration'.

"In this 'integrative behaviour'
22) the one partner certainly has plans and intents and an outlook of his

own, and certainly hopes that his companion will agree with them and coöperate with him. Yet it is not his primary aim to secure agreement with them as they stand. Instead he regards his contact with a companion as an opportunity for testing their validity, trying them out in the setting of a different personality. This does not mean merely being ready to modify them under pressure. It means an over-riding concern to be impartial in making his suggestions and to avoid all pressure or forcefulness or undue persuasiveness which would make criticism more difficult. All he does is to offer his companion a new possibility of be-

haviour or belief and try to ensure that obstacles to the fair understanding of it are removed. At the same time he is exposing himself and his intentions to the reaction they produce in his companion. The conception is of a fully reciprocal social process by which two people are each modified and something new, unpredictable, and different from both of them emerges. It is a development of personality, 'a process of change in structure or function that results from increasingly complex relations with persons different from one's self.'

"What Anderson means by integration is made clearer by his account he gives of domination and submission. The dominative person

knows what he believes and what he wants, and he has no intention of changing because he meets someone who thinks differently. As Anderson puts it:

"'He does not yield to difference; he is not abandoning his status; he is trying to preserve status. He is not seeking a better understanding of another nor is he trying to achieve a redefining of desires, values, or objectives in order to discover a lower common denominator of difference. ---- Domination seeks not self-abandoning, but self-preservation. It resists change.'

"As for submission, Anderson goes on:

"'Domination tends to induce resistance. But resistance is itself dominating behaviour. If the relative strength is too great, domination will produce submission.

"Resistance and submission are both fear responses; they show fear of losing status quo. Submission is not to be confused with yielding. Submission is a coerced response of fear; it is not spontaneous. 'Yielding is a spontaneous response by an individual so unconcerned with his own security that he is not afraid to change, or give up his present status.

"For the present purpose the importance of 'social integration' is that it stands for a mode of handling

divergences of aim and opinion which is totally different from war, and not just a more restrained form of the same dominative behaviour. It is true that this is very remote from practical politics. But if we want to find an uncompromising meaning for 'peace' — and without this a discussion of war is apt to be inconclusive — the idea of social integration holds out one possibility.

"'Integration!' explains the sceptical reader. 'More jargon and mystery-mongering! What is there here except the perfectly familiar facts of coöperation and compromise?' Admittedly, integrative behaviour has always been practised; it

24) was not originated in the nursery schools of Iowa where Anderson studied it. But, on the other hand, coöperation and compromise as we usually meet them are something very different from what Anderson describes. The 'coöperativeness' that we pay lip-service to may perhaps be the same as integration. The cooperation we meet in practice is totally different. In most cases it means that two or more people find that they have some aim in common, so that each can achieve his object more effectively if they work as a team. At other times it means that by helping someone to achieve his object we indirectly achieve our own as well; most

forms of employment and buying and selling involve this sort of coöperation. But in all these instances we are dealing with mutual help in achieving aims which each partner has already formulated for himself and is not invited to change. Integration, on the other hand, is a mode of handling differences of aim. Again, we sometimes call a person 'coöperative' when we mean 'submissive' or docile in helping us with our own plans. And finally there are occasions when 'coöperation' means that we submit to help our associate in his aims on the understanding that we can claim his submissive help in our aims later on. Now in

all these cases integrative behaviour may at times occur. But it need not. Such coöperation or social bargaining may – and commonly does – take place without it.

"What of compromise? Here certainly differences of opinion or aim – the essential preliminary to integration – do occur. But the compromises that we generally meet with still fall short of integration. They occur when the effort at domination has been so powerful on both sides that each does had to concede a point and make partial submission in order to secure what he wants in other directions. No new principle is introduced by compromise; the domination is no longer on one side only,

but domination and submission still provide the mould in which the relationship is cast. What results is a rupture of the original opposing aims, not a true compound. And, of course, in most compromises neither side is satisfied. Each would still prefer his original intention. In social integration, by contrast, each partner has spontaneously accepted the newly emergent aim as more satisfying than what he originally intended. ----

"It is integrative behaviour which gives the greatest social significance to other people, and to practise it extensively means that social responsiveness is highly developed

in comparison with other interests and desires. Other people are taken seriously. The greatest possible significance is given both to their sanctioning and to their challenging of one's own personality. Domination, in contrast, always involves a belittling of other people's social significance; they become helpers, or dependents, or employees, instead of companions. At the extreme they may be treated only as if they were tools or obstacles, objects in the outer world that happen to be animate and so have more varied powers than rocks and stones and trees. War, of course, is bound to belittle the social significance of people in this way.

"It is from this point of view

that war appears only as an extreme form of a mode of social behaviour that is widely accepted as inevitable. Many have pointed out that there is no complete change of outlook when people go to war. One way of putting the fact is to say with Lasswell (1935) that the populations of the world live in the 'expectation of violence' as the only way of bringing to an end – favourably or calamitously – their gathering animosities. Violent coercion may be staved off for a long while, but it is awaited as the ultimate outcome of the crises of tension between conflicting national aims. No other conducive way of handling

the dispute can be convinced. In civil life domination is the recognized solution to disputes. Economic pressure, the leverage given by social status, and the persuasive manipulation of public opinion are the usual weapons. The individual makes his final appeal to physical force only through the united authority, the laws and police. He need not use physical violence on his own responsibility. But there is no supra-national authority, and the nation must act on its own responsibility. When a nation sets about dominating another by force, in order to settle a dispute, the citizen feels that it is only doing what he would finally have to do

in civil life if there were no central authority.

"He would do it with regret, just as he regrets the necessity for his nation to go to war. For he realizes, dimly or clearly, that he has social impulses which conflict with the intention of annihilating other human beings as if they were only inconvenient objects in the material world. They are part of his social world. Even in the front-line trenches he may develop an inconvenient tendency to fraternize with them. The institutions regulating war give these social impulses a form that makes them more manageable and at the same time more

systematic and predictable in their outcome. Prisoners are to be treated in specified ways, the wounded given consideration, civilians spared, certain types of weapons avoided, and so forth. These regulations are a way of recognizing that war is not a matter of simple attack on natural obstacles; we do not blast away a nation with the same cheerfulness as we do a fall of rock. War is a way of influencing people socially, of getting them to recognize our rights and to accept a social relationship with us of a sort that we consider satisfactory. It is the survivors of the defeated nation that we are really interested in. Killing their friends has not been

a way of improving the national world, or hiding malaimal mor-
gintics would be; it has been
the only way we could find of
putting right something in the
social world.

28 "The reason it seems to be
the only way is that dominative
behaviour in the face of disa-
greements is the only means
that has received effective public
recognition and has been strongly
institutionalized. Integrative
behaviour does occur, and, if
we could give it public, insti-
tutional status, we should notice
it more readily. We might then
be surprised to find how frequent
it already is. But look at the

newspapers, or listen to snaps of conversation in the streets, and observe how much more interested we are in dispute and conflict. Sticking up for your own opinion, standing firm for 'what you know to be right', refusing to be turned aside - in fact, seeing the maximum social influence for what you already are instead of trying to develop - these are the attitudes which we encourage and for which our legal institutions cater. And they are the attitudes which we eventually oppose in war." - - -

74-75 "The Churches provide the most striking examples of the way that institutions with social power are

bound to become propaganda agents
for the Government when a
national war has been undertaken.
An established Church which
stood on one side or actually
opposed a war, when the nation
as a corporate body was
committed to it, would have
lost its power and place in the
community by the time peace
came. It would have become a
minority movement. It is
only because it is content to
be a minority movement in
this culture that the Society of
Friends is able to stand aside
from national wars, and
not merely deplore war."

small scale

[Small scale plus quality of thought

count more than numbers. Better be a
homone. [illegible] —

p.89 ---- "The latent tautology of Rivers'
statement (they don't fight because —
they do not fight) illustrates our
cultural preconception that we
fight because some eternal power
has provided us with enemies, and
not, as the fact is, because we and
someone else have entered into en-
mity with one another.

90. "Our difficulty in fully accepting
this idea goes back to the fact that
we live in a domination society. War
is therefore only a high-light of our
habitual way of handling disagreements.
We feel that we would only too
gladly manage without war

itself, but to abandon the general dominative pattern ~~itself~~ on which it is based seems out of the question. The dominative pattern strikes us as so 'natural'. Thus it can only be with the greatest difficulty, if at all, that we entertain the idea that our dominative behaviour is an institution which our culture has devised and which we are perpetuating. It will be as difficult for us as it is for a neurotic invalid to believe that his incapacitating illness is a creation of his own." - - -

pp 196 - (Re propaganda) "A far more satisfactory usage is to apply the

term to any persuasion that is domin-
ative in intention. Even argument
that has no trace of dishonesty may
be called propaganda if it proceeds
with the sole intention of securing
other people's agreement and sup-
port.

"What other intention could it
have? There is another. The in-
itiator may express his views more
tentatively and offer it with the
feeling that though he would like
197 the other to agree, it is much more
important that this other person
should test it thoroughly, to the
full extent of his capacity, and in
the light of his own information
and his own scale of values. In
other words, the initiator values

not mere agreement and the increased social power or sense of solidarity which that produces; he values agreement as a sign that his conviction has been tried out in another human context and found to be satisfactory there as well. If this is his approach his main concern will be for the quality of the act of agreement, and this will affect his whole presentation of the subject. Instead of aiming at the greatest plausibility of presentation he will aim at the greatest fairness, and it will be as important to stress the limitations of his case, and the attractiveness of conflicting views, as to

display its ~~own~~ strength. This way of presenting a case, rare though it is, ought perhaps to be the ideal of the educator whenever he offers his own value judgments or opinions to another person. ---

199 --- "~~Each~~ And this means that every fresh presentation of a point of view is to be regarded not solely as a missionary enterprise but also as a new test of one's case. ---

[Another purpose is to learn something about the personality of the other by the quality of his reaction ~~to it~~]
Not only what he thinks but why (he thinks it ~~to~~)

~~p 207. "Supposing we took that idea~~

p. 205. "The assumptions of a domi-
native society have been challenged,
and their psychological validity
denied, by three psychological
writers: Perry, Suttie, and Ander-
son. Each works from his own
specialized standpoint, and none
of them makes any reference to
206 the other two. As an anthropol-
ogist, Perry emphasizes the fact
that cultures have very largely
created their institutions of coercive
domination. Suttie's contribution
is made from the psycho-thera-
peutic standpoint. He shows
the mechanisms within the
family which enable one
society to perpetuate its dominative
pattern, and which create a

closed circuit shielding its assumptions from criticism. Anderson has given the most fundamental statement of the nature of domination and the alternative to it. His work, moreover, has brought the question within range of the most matter-of-fact and verifiable observation. For the present problem the importance of these three writers is that they invite us to conceive of a system of social life which would stand in sharp contrast to war and would not be merely a taming of the same coercive principle.

"Chap XIII. The Notion of Peace

"Supposing we took these ideas seriously, what conception of a peaceful society should we reach?

Some people seem to assume that the most utopian hope for society is that of reaching a condition in which disagreements and dislikes no longer occur — neither between individuals nor between groups. Stressing the 'brotherhood of man', some liberals and pacifists tend to deny the persistent differences between one social group and another; they belittle the differences between German and Frenchman, Jew and Gentile, negro and white, labourer and shopkeeper, village and city. Now this, for all its mild amiability, is a typical outcome of the dominative attitude. It shows the dom-

inative mind in reverse, reacting against itself. ---

p. 208 "This type of humanism is not an alternative to domination. For a true alternative we must turn to some such conception as Anderson's 'social integration'. The integrative attitude aims neither at leaving people as they are nor at making them like oneself, for it regards ~~people as~~ differences between two people as mutual invitations to development. Far from denying differences, it gives the closest attention to them, seeing them as an enrichment of human potentiality. Such an attitude does not imply a spineless or irresponsible abandoning of standards, nor a

meek submissiveness. It does not exclude strong preferences and bitter dislikes. All it does exclude is the itch to root out what we dislike. It implies that even the complete conviction that another person's view is inferior to our own is no good reason for trying to alter it by pressure or propaganda. We can show the other person an alternative, if he is willing to be shown, but if he still likes his own way there's an end to it. And this amounts to saying that, if integrative behaviour is impossible at some points of contact with our associates, then at those

points we must forego any true social relationship. The self-deception of a dominative society consists in the belief that at such points full social satisfactions can still be obtained in the relationship of self-assertion and self-submission. In fact the dominative society suggests that to win submissive deference from others is one of the highest satisfactions that social life can offer, whether to individuals or to national groups.

(autonomy ?)

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"Here a possible misconception must be guarded against. It might be thought that a non-dominative society would involve a belief in some 'equality' between people which would deny us the im-

portant satisfactions of winning social prestige. But this would be a complete mistake. The integrative relationship in social contacts means that an outstanding achievement by one person will win the respect of others but not their deference. These terms will perhaps serve, though the reader may prefer others. All that matters is that the distinction should be noticed. The essential distinction is that when deference is present the admiration expressed for a particular achievement may be to some extent bogus, expressed partly in order not to disappoint the expectation of deference. Simple respect, on the other hand, represents a judgment which has been

made without any irrelevant pressure; the admiration which is expressed has arisen spontaneously. If you withhold respect the person who wanted it will be disappointed, and he may consider your judgment mistaken, but he will not consider that you have failed in an obligation to him. The social obligation is satisfied equally by admiration and by adverse criticism.

"Giving a person respect implies that you admire him for some specific reason, but does not commit you to admiring him in other directions or deferring to his opinions or acquiescing in his intentions. It implies the role of companion – at least at this point of contact – and

not servant or subordinate. But
210 where deference has been established
the deferential person cannot withhold
his support from any of the other's
achievements without some faint
degree of rebellion. In polite society
naturally, this goes on with the
utmost delicacy. Those who enjoy
deference are often most anxious
to encourage - at their own discretion - some measure of independent criticism in their associates. But in the last resort they expect, and are expected, to take the dominant part. Admiration, agreement, support, come not as social gifts made freely on each separate occasion, but partly as a tribute in recognition of a gen-

ment, generalized relationships existing between them and their associates. There can consequently never be any certainty that irrelevant pressures have not contributed to an opinion offered to one who enjoys deference.

"Deference arises in a setting of domination and submission, respect in one of integration. But again it must be emphasized that respect does not imply equality between the companions concerned. The schoolboy respects certain famous cricketers; he is not equal to them, but he respects one and withholds respect from another according to his spontaneous emotions. - - - -

Naturally, in our society, respect and deference get hopelessly entangled.

Respect for a particular achievement is constantly expected to carry with it general deference. The eminent scientist expects deference to his political views; the wealthy stockbroker to his taste in house furnishing; the distinguished military man to his views on the upbringing of children. Incidentally, we must also notice that deference may be accompanied by love. Loving deference is the accepted attitude for young children towards their parents. At adolescence the tricky crossing to respect has to be attempted. What often emerges is continued affection, a show of deference, and no respect.

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Social interaction is at present

organized mainly along gradients of deference. Noble birth, wealth, formal education, age, sex (producing deference for men and a show of deference for women), bureaucratic and quasi-bureaucratic authority, power to employ and power to buy (even in a small way) are some of the guiding lines for deference. Fame and eminence, which might be valued as a mark of the genuine respect of those competent to judge, are in fact valued largely for the deference they secure; hence there is no reason for not achieving them by fraud and bluff. A society in which respect took the place which deference at present holds, and integrative behaviour replaced dominative

and submissive, would be remarkably different from ours. But, as Ruth Benedict points out, very sweeping changes in social norms can occur, and have occurred in Western communities even in comparatively recent times. When the change is complete the extreme representatives of the old norm strike us as pathological. Benedict sees such a possibility for our own culture.

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212 "But if we prefer integrative behaviors, what psychological roots has this preference? Is it just a personal choice which depends on temperamental qualities? I think it can be shown to have deeper roots. The objection to domination is

that it comes inevitably into conflict with the more developed forms of social impulse. As social interests and the drive for companionship develop and are clarified, it is towards integrative relationships that they lead. The domineering, the narcissistic, the aggressive, the obsequious, the compliant, and the dependent all gain social satisfactions of a kind. But they all met the same difficulty: companionship, sympathy, mutual liking and esteem are satisfactions that cannot be obtained by using force or yielding to it. Our social development cannot proceed very far before this inherent objection to the use of force appears. Once we reach the point of wanting people

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not merely to serve and support us but also to like us and give us their free respect, force can never secure what we want. Demanding affection with menaces is an infantile weakness whose illogic we can easily see, at least in our more adult moments. But it takes some time to realize this, and naturally many people never do. All life long they try to bully others - with open aggressiveness or emotional blackmail - into liking them, respecting their views and achievements, giving them affectionate consideration. They often get a good imitation of what they want, but the obsession is and often they themselves

can see it as

:-- mouth honors, breath
which the poor hunt would fain deny
and dare not ;'

" Or worse still they have a growing
suspicion that they are being 'humored'.
The central dilemma of the dominative
person is that he cannot high-handedly
reject his associate's disagreement
without implicitly depreciating his
agreement. By domination he
belittles the other person socially,
and so diminishes the value of his
214 companionship. As social development
proceeds, slaves, (see next page)
(see pp 214, 220, 228,)

Anderson H.H. - Genetic Psychology
Monographs XXI, 3, Aug 1939 "Domination + Social Integration in the

Behaviour of Kindergarten Children
+ Teachers.

Perry W. The Children of the Sun, London 1923

The Primordial Ocean
London 1935

Suttie I. D. The Origins of
Love + Hate London 1935

(continued) "hired 'companions', prostitutes, flatterers and parasites, yes-men and nodders grow less and less satisfactory. Companionship, appreciation, agreement, offered freely and without pressure, are what a developed social interest leads us to value.

"Fundamentally, I believe, it is this development of social responsiveness that makes us begin to feel half-hearted about warfare: nowadays. The

material cost and the physical danger and misery all count. But the greatest objection is a creeping sense of the pointlessness of war. People let their thoughts wander too soon to the peace conference, when, if they are the victors, they know that the only course will be to try to restore a companionship with the vanquished. In expected reaction against this rather paralysing truth the more naive begin to talk of wholesale extermination. Let us convince ourselves, they say in effect, that the Germans (or the French or Russians or British, according to the State we happen to be fighting) are literally subhuman, not to be given any more social regard than a horde of Lombroso rats. Wipe them out and start afresh! In fact, of course we cannot do this: we have allowed our

social nature to develop too far. Both the half-heartedness and the exasperated blood-thirstiness are the result of perceiving the inconsistency of warfare — the onslaught on people as if they were hideous rats, all the time with the intention of winning more satisfactory companionship from them.

"It is not only war that brings out this dilemma of a dominative society. Another closely related problem, that

215 of the handling of criminals, reveals precisely the same difficulty. In the older penal methods we reject some part of the criminal's personality with entire confidence in our own standards and as high-handedly as we should nip diseased buds out of a plant. This would be all

right if we wanted him solely as a docile slave, an inanimate machine. But, inconsistently, we then expect him to become 'rehabilitated' as a social being. He must bring the remains of his personality, pruned and trimmed according to our taste, and tactfully offer us that in full companionship. It is not surprising that this method has been one long-drawn-out failure. Now, fortunately, a change has begun, a change which arises out of the same inward social responsiveness that makes cures begin to look futile. We are coming to realize that a social group cannot expect the gift of a personality, even an unsatisfactory one, unless it earns it socially. And that means meeting it non-dominatively. Consequently,

modern penal reform and the scientific treatment of delinquency have tended towards a more integrative attitude ~~toward~~ to the criminal. It is recognized that his peculiarities can be dealt with only if society is willing to modify itself as well as him. He has done something that society does not like, and it usually turns out that society had already done something that he did not like. In other words, a series of differences has occurred, all of them handled with domination on one side and sentiment on the other. The only sound policy is to find an integrative way of undoing what has been done to the criminal. Society, through the agency

of its psycho-therapists, must invite
216 him to re-examine the underlying dispute
and must offer him society's point of
view in a more integrative way than he
has met with in the past.

"This detached point of view, however,
cannot guide us with every immediate
problem. Once a social conflict has
assumed an acute form, as in crime
and equally in war, dominative behav-
iour is prompted by the simple need to
preserve one's existence and one's essential
ideals. [Here is where), RPsg, differs with
the author. Society was at fault in letting matters
reach such a crisis. Society initiated the
wrong relationships. Society is the more power-
ful. Some members of society must : risk
being harmed in order to appease the wrong.
They must be Satyagrahis. Only religion

will provide such people. "He that loseth his life shall find it". If Society make an integrated relationship it cannot persuade the other party by first resorting to the old dominative sort of behaviour. This holds in both war & crime.]

Ch. XIV

Relinquishing Domination

219.

"If we accept some such notion of peace as the preceding chapter has suggested, how are we to set about reaching it? Must we work through the broad features of political machinery or through the more intimate structure of social life? If there seems to be an alternative here it is a delusion. Neither line of work can succeed without the other. In particular, political institutions can never far outrun the sentiments

and habits of thought of individual citizens. When a law is passed on the strength of ruling opinions that are only precariously established – as, for instance, then that supported prohibition in America – slight shifts of opinion are enough to cause a land-slide in which the whole institutional structure collapses. International politics are no different. The citizen who browbeats his subordinates, bluffs and tricks his rivals, and is in turn snubbed by his wife and daughters, cannot suddenly become a different man when he argues about politics. He cannot wholeheartedly support an integrative policy in foreign affairs, a policy which may mean giving away when we have the power to stand firm. Political maturity

cannot outrun ordinary social maturity. All that the political
220 institution can do is to consolidate the more intimate social advances and thus help to create the conditions for further advance.

"The first fact to be recognized is that the dominative method of handling differences cannot be relinquished while people feel insecure. As Anderson points out, domination is the product of insecurity in the face of differences and in turn generates further insecurity. [Again], RBsg, differ. By using a few specially disciplined + understanding people who, by reason of religion, are ready & willing to lose their lives or ll for society,

criminals & insane can be dealt with by n.v. boxing, permanent restraint & help & this on behalf of society begins the integrative process. The same can be done in international civil warfare, I believe.]

"Now one feature of our social order is the 'reputation of violence', and this helps to keep alive throughout the nations the very insanity that we want to end. It follows that any changes which make for greater restraint to war may be valuable, even if in one sense they are relatively superficial. They may not form an impregnable barrier against war, but by slightly increasing the obstacles in its way they do something to increase that sense of security which makes domination and resistance seem less necessary. — —

-- "Social and economic changes can do much. But in order to save the 'strains of peace' at all thoroughly some way must be found of handling the more deeply submerged confusions of feeling and attitude.

"Here we must break off to follow another line of argument which leads to the same conclusion. So far I have discussed means of strengthening our opposition to war and our attachment to peace. The most that could be achieved along these lines would be the acceptance of a supra-national authority which would tame the dominative principle and keep it under some degree of control. This would not give a radical peace organized on a different principle

from the dominative society. For an uncompromising eradication of war and quarrel we have to aim at withdrawing the present universal reaction from the idea that domination and submission - or a mixture of the two in compromise - provide the only social pattern for the handling of difference.

"How can this aim be achieved? The first recommendation must be an unpalatable one: that we should each as far as possible relinquish our own dominative attitudes. This conflicts with 227
our long-established preference for improving others by dominative means: - - -
Moreover, our domination is largely beyond our conscious control and we cannot hope to carry out the recommendation at all thoroughly. It is like living

advised 'Do not be remote!' The tendency cannot be dealt with by domination directed against ourselves, a fact which is bound to chagrin the dominative (See War Dance by E. Graham Howe, Scribner, 1937)

A great deal, nonetheless, is within our conscious control. Much can be done in the way of mapping our jealousies and observing when we give and when we reject deference; and when we ought to give, and when we can reasonably claim respect. The difficulties do not exempt anyone from trying to be less dominative (or less submissive, according to his temperamental reaction to the pattern of domination and submission). To break the vicious circle of domination and submission at one

point is probably as important as anything in the growth of the individual person. The greater his social influence, the more effort his achievement of integrative behaviour is likely to have.

"But there is also ample scope for the more congenial activity of influencing others and altering institutions. - - - - - -

228 "Whenever economic and social reforms are mentioned it is assumed that they are primarily intended to make things better for the underdog. It is the natural assumption of people who are both patronizing and guilty - the natural assumption of a dominative society which has glimmerings of social maturity. In connection with reform aimed at mediating war

the assumption is particularly inept, since it is certainly not the individual who has most to say in deciding on wars. The most important reforms — for the present purpose — are not those which aim at lifting the lowest classes to the economic, moral, and hygienic level of the classes above them, but those which could apply to the life of people of all classes. Security and justice, dominating safeguarding of one's status are found high up in the scale of earned income. And many whose unearned economic security is beyond all question have equally intense anxieties over their status in other directions. An integrative system of society must

be achieved unless some way is found of relieving all classes of their insecurities, of freeing them from the anxious conviction that happiness depends on keeping a sufficient number of people below them on the gradient of deference."

Quotes from "The Kingdom of God & The Son of Man" of Rudolph Otto trans from new German ed. Sutherworth Press, London 1938.

P.110 "The difference as compared with the meaning given previously would then be this - hitherto it was only prophesied, only prepared; hitherto one could only hope for it, wait, prepare oneself and others for it; but now it is grasped, possessed, held fast as that which has come. That would not delineate the Kingdom as purely future - something which is only future cannot be stormed,

grasped, held fast, but only something tangibly near & present. But biazein in the active & middle means to exercise force, one's own force, to be forcibly operative, to act violently. In the first case the second half of the saying would be a mere tautology, but in the second case it would be an excellent counterpart to the content of the first half of the verse. The Kingdom of which Christ speaks in the Beelzebub passage does not suffer but exercises violence; similarly in the parables which we have still to examine - 'Baistai' in the second half of the verse does not mean those who have suffered violence but those who exercise violence;

and biazetai is to be understood in the same way - The corresponding word in Hebrew is chāzaqs in the hithpael. Jesus, who did not speak Greek, used some such word with the same connotation. Chāzaq means to be strong, then to become strong, grow, increase, become powerful, and especially obtain the ascendancy.[I] All of these related meanings are expressed in the word chāzaq, and since a preacher to the masses does not think in definite and narrowly limited concepts, but uses his words with a net work of connotations, we too must listen for these connotations when Christ is speaking - But among the associated meanings we may presume, on the

I Judges 1. 28; When Israel obtained the ascendancy -

basis of Christ's apocalyptic ideas, that that of obtaining the ascendancy received special stress. It corresponded most nearly to the eschatological idea; it corresponded in particular to the utterance in the Beelzebub passage. For it was one of the ideas of apocalyptic eschatology that other powers, indeed than Satan himself, had previously taken over control; but that the time would come when the Kingdom of God would gain the ascendancy over them & him, and depose them. This was now beginning, and that fact formed the characteristic difference between the time of Jesus and earlier times.

3. "And those who exercise force

seize it. Here we have the other side of the matter. The law and the prophets could only prophesy it, John only prepare the way for it, but now one could seize it, gain it, come to participate in it. Luke says in xvi. 16: —

And every one presses his way into it by force.

Both phrases mean the same thing, for when one seizes a kingdom one presses into it, and when one presses into it one seizes it. Jesus also speaks elsewhere of entering into the kingdom.)

4. On the one hand, the kingdom exercises force; on the other, those who exercise force seize it. Thus combination & contrast sums up the whole of Jesus' preaching

and its characteristic bi-polarity of thought. For on the one side, the Kingdom comes and works and affects and seizes and grows of itself, without man's being able to do anything to help. And yet on the other side, only by summoning all one's powers, and with the most strenuous determination, does one press into it.

If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out + cast it from thee;
He who puts his hand to the plough + looks back is not fit for the kingdom of God;
Strive to enter in through the narrow gate
Leave the dead to bury their dead and come + follow me;
He who does not hate father or mother for my sake....

These are forcible words, and only biastai, men who exercise force, fulfil them. They presuppose biastai, with chazegim, as their doers."

P. 117 — 7.

"This parable, [the Sower,] is a strict unit in meaning and form. There is nothing to allegorize in, nothing to psychologize, nothing to interpret in detail. We can understand it's perfectly simple and single point. This point is introduced by the word 'so,' in such a manner in v 26. Two processes are compared: the one ordinary, well known, it's familiar features repeated every year; the other a spiritual and invisible process. The former was meant to

be an analogy to make the latter known, understood, and graphic, its peculiar quality shining before the eyes of the hearer. Both processes, however, are processes of growth. What was to be made clear was that in the second case, just like the first, growth was a thing which resulted 'of itself,' of its own urge and power of growth and was, thereby, independent of the doing, the willing, causing, or working, indeed even of the knowledge and observation of man. After the seed is sown, the man goes away, sleeps or wakes at home, & does nothing. The seed is left to itself, and its fate does not depend on the waking or sleeping, the working or not working of man.

the grains which fell by the wayside dried up, the sun parched them because they lay too near the surface; the birds picked up what fell accidentally on stony ground at one side, unknown to the sower. The seed which fell on cultivated ~~ground~~ Land grows, imperceptibly, quietly, unnoticed "he knoweth not how," and still less does he cause it. Quietly it puts forth blade and ear and grain - it is not his doing. 'Of itself,' while he is far away, doing nothing, unable to do anything; it is remote from his action, indeed from his observation; the earth of itself brings forth blade, ear, and ripe grain by its own power, working independent

of man — 'he knoweth not how.' He does not know how it is done, how it happens. It is hidden from his eyes, it is a mystery."

"But this mystery of acting "in itself" lies the tertium comparationis, the analogy. Hence the word 'so' 'in precisely the same way' in V. 26. 'So,' that is by this analogy, it is with the kingdom of God, as when else. The kingdom of God grows in the same way, quietly, secretly, unseen by dim eyes. It develops and grows by divine, not human power; works and grows in a way that he does not know mysteriously, in its own way, by its own power, automatos. It ripens in "fruits of righteousness", in some

cases thirty-fold, in others sixty fold, in others a hundredfold - and all this as God's deed, not as man's deed.

The thing thus compared with a seed growing of itself is naturally not the kingdom of God as eternally present with him in heaven. Rather it is the secret miraculous activity which from the days of John exercises its force quietly, mightily, irresistibly; and as it is eternally in heaven, it is now on earth; it is breaking in, it comes, makes a place for itself, spreads victoriously, develops about men + in them, and is variously productive of fruits, fruits of repentance and of the new righteousness. It is one + the same kingdom, which is also

in heaven, but it is only when the kingdom which is beginning already, imperceptibly spreading, miraculously encompassing, inwardly & outwardly extending its realm of power, that it is 'do' as when a man steps aside idly while the earth bears fruit of itself. It is logically eschatological, not from the standpoint of our 'logical eschatologists', but from that of the Miracle of God as Jesus envisaged it, and as he intended with his incomparable impressiveness and clarity to bring it before our blind eyes in this his finest parable."

"The saying runs:

P 119 "He who does not receive the Kingdom of God like a child shall not enter into it.

'Receive', 'accept' like Children - that is the new way to salvation which Jesus points out. It is the way which corresponds least to the Pharisaic mind + orientation, but diametrically opposes it, and this is not in mere details, not in individual didactic propositions, but in its whole inner attitude of mind, which is indeed quite different. No better or more appropriate term could be applied to the specifically Pharisaic attitude than 'unchildlike', 'contrary to the childish nature', and Jesus

could not have contrasted 'the way of God' with the way of the Pharisees more appropriately than with the words 'like a child'.

What does 'childlike' or 'childlike disposition' mean? It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to define 'childlike attitude'; it must be intuitively perceived in its individuality, grasped intuitively rather than by definition; it must be felt. Its most prominent single feature is the deep and essential contrast of the naive to the reflective, of emotional comprehension to theory and method, of the unconscious and spontaneous to consciousness, volition, affectation, and technique, of simplicity to punctiliousness and casuistry,

of simplicity of heart to artificiality and professionalism and eccentricity, of immediate perception to hair-splitting and subtlety, of the intuitive to the discursive ratio. Punctiliousness threatened to appear in Pharisaic method; it consisted of a striving to become righteous before God by skilfully following a legal technique and subtlety developing a legal science — The process became evermore unchildlike, theoretical, academic, and hair-splitting The Law, the skillful handling of it, and punctilious legality, intervened between God and a heart in immediate contact with Him. The Scribe and the one who knew

and observed in detail the jots and tittles of the Law became the religious ideal of this tendency. 'To receive as a child' without hair-splitting erudition, is a simplicity of heart which neither understands nor uses techniques, subtleties, and learned rabbinic pettifoggery; above all, to receive, instead of desiring to cause, produce, compel - Jesus word about the children sets this forth as the true way of salvation in opposition to the Pharisees."

P. 123 "The Mustard Seed -"

"Closely associated with the parable of the seed growing of itself is the parable of the mustard seed which grows into a large tree

(Mk iii. 31ff) Here, too, we have to do with something growing mysteriously. It naturally as a growing thing it is also opposed to everything which man can do or perform, but that is at best only a secondary question here and not the main point. The parable shares with the preceding in treating of a kingdom that is not merely future. A future kingdom cannot grow and in no possible sense can it be compared with a growing thing. In the present case, Christ puts something before men's eyes which is already in action around himself and his hearers as a miraculous process which they ought to perceive + rightly understand as being such.

The point here, however, is not so much that the devine work goes forward 'of itself' as that it makes an unpretentious beginning, and on reaching completion has the widest of compasses—

(2) What is it that grows so mightily and extensively? In the parable of the seed growing of itself it may be designated as the the new righteousness of the kingdom of God; as that which according to Christ's ~~thought~~ should be in and with men, and which is present where God really rules in and over men; it grows not because men decide or act accordingly but because ~~men~~ the spontaneous divine dinamic is an inner urge (com-

-parable to the urge of the Spirit and rebirth through the Spirit.)

P 125 — "The Leaven —

"Mt. XIII. 33 & Lk. XIII. 21 add to the parable of the Mustard seed that of the leaven, of which a little, leavens the whole mass. The point here is the same as in the preceding case; to start from a limited beginning and spread throughout the whole. The ancient parent document omits the parable, not because it did not know of more two parables of Christ — it knows and actually says that he taught with many such parables — but because its purpose was only to characterize, and perhaps because it regarded the meaning of the

parable of the Mustard seed as identical with that of the leaven. The latter is the prevailing opinion of exegetes today. Perhaps it is right. In that case the present point would be merely the extension of the kingdom. But to compare it with leaven which not only spreads, but penetrates and also transforms by its leavening power, points too strongly to a more special meaning. First little, then much: that also holds good here, but in the sense of the working of an inner process of transformation, which begins partim and ends totaliter. We read: 'until the whole was leavened'. Jesus speaks elsewhere of such a part which, by its nature and

in its effects penetrates into the whole, and this in the sense of a process in Man himself:

If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness -

With such a meaning our Parable would approximate to that of the seed growing of itself. In the latter spontaneous growth, in the former inner transformation - neither effected by human power. At the same time, in the former is the particular Mysterium: a most unpretentious beginning, followed by the greatest of results."

P 127

"The kingdom of heaven is like a net which, when cast into the sea, gathers together 'of every kind' (Mt. XIII. 47.

3 This eye-opening parable, brief, concise like an epigram, agreeing in arrangement and style with the similarly epigrammatic parable of the treasure and pearl, which immediately precede in VV. 44-46, has been preserved by Matthew, who immediately appends a detailed allegorical explanation by way of commentary (Mt. XIII. 48-50). Just as he misunderstood the Clue of the parable of the Seed growing of itself and transformed it into an allegory of the existing

Church, where the good grew with the bad, like tares and wheat, so here also he allegorizes the parable of the net and makes it refer to the Church, which includes good & bad. He also finds an allegory of both in the judgment at the end of the age and the sorting out between the two classes. He Make Jesus reiterate the commonplace teaching that at the last judgment a distinction will be made between the righteous & the unrighteous, a teaching which contained nothing new, and which every one of his hearers had long known. At this stage, why the kingdom of heaven should be like a net

and cast into the sea was no longer comprehensible -

The parable, however, does not speak about good and bad, but about men 'of every kind'. Kind = Greek genus = Hebrew min. When God in Gen. i. 25, created all animals 'lemino', He did not create good + bad animals, but animals of various kinds and each one according to his kind - Good and bad are not distinguished by belonging to different genera, but are within the same genus. Jesus does not speak of the good + the bad and of their fate in the last judgment, but of a present miracle of the divine Power, which, already

breaking in, already working; succeeds in bringing together Men of every kind who otherwise would never have met — a marvel to behold, a sign for seeing eyes. Here again the kingdom is comprehensive, a sphere; but the stress does not rest on that aspect now. Rather the stress rests upon the fact that it seizes, carries with it, brings together, the unwilling and varied elements into a unity; exercises its force, and already exercises it visibly."

(129) "Both parables were probably intended to bring out in addition a particular point. For it cannot be accidental that in both a particular feature recurs. Both speak not only of a general striving but

in motion by a particularly prized blessing, but both agree in having the feature of an accidental discovery. The feature in common is that a blessing meets one and offers itself unexpectedly, without calculation, unforeseen, not computed by human skill or calculation, but independently of them. Thus it is with the kingdom of God as a blessing of salvation; one cannot compute it, know about it of oneself, and personally seek access to it. It must meet me, let me find it, flash forth of itself, not by a human quest."

P. 142 "What is that which one person has, in order to obtain ever more of it, until he has an abundance, and which another person has not, and this in such a way, that not having results in his losing even the little which he has? It is just the capacity of being able to see and hear spiritually, of being open to the mystery from above."-

P. 150 - "There are three reasons why Jesus' original teaching that the Kingdom was already dawning fell into the background and was lost to sight.

(1) The later Christology displaced Jesus' own Christology, and

thereby the idea of the regnum Christi as already present displaced that of the regnum Dei as already dawning.

(2) The experience of the kingdom was explained as the experience of the Spirit.

(3) The conception of the Church displaced the conception of the mystery of the kingdom.

P. 289 "This is my body (i.e. this is I myself as broken) and I appoint the kingdom unto you by covenant, as my Father has appointed it to me. - - - -

p. 292 such a covenant, a promise binding the promiser himself, is meant in our pericope, when God appoints (stipulates) the kingdom for His Son by a diathēkē; and when Christ in turn appoints unto his disciples the kingdom appointed unto him, i.e. in a binding manner gives them the possession of it. Birth may therefore be the equivalent of testamentum. This connotation is quite clearly present here in the immediate context of the words: this am I (viz. the one about to die), and I establish (= appoint) unto you ... As one who is going to die, he makes arrangements

Consequently the action he performs is in fact his testament to his disciples. This meaning is quite consonant with the situation and is that in which the word diathēkē is to be understood in the present context. The meaning was still operative when at a later date it was transformed into a diathēkē in his blood, for, in so doing, the close connection with his death was clearly indicated."

WILDLIFE

We need another, and wiser, and perhaps a more mystical concept of animals. Remote from universal nature, and living by complicated artifice, man-in-civilization surveys the creature through the glass of his knowledge, and sees thereby a feature magnified, and the whole image in distortion.

We patronize them for their incompleteness, for their tragic fate in having taken form so far beneath ourselves. And therein we err, and greatly err. For the animal shall not be measured by man. In a world older and more complete than ours, they move finished and complete; gifted with extensions of the senses we have lost or never attained; living by voices we shall never hear.

They are not brethren, they are not underlings. They are other nations, caught with ourselves in the net of life and time, fellow prisoners of the splendor and travail of the earth.

Rengeton: Outermost House.

Extract from a letter to Graham Carey from A.K. Coomaraswamy re symbolism:

"What the secular mind does is to assert that we symbolists are reading meanings into things that originally had none: our assertion is that they are reading out the meanings. The proof of our contention lies in the ~~perception~~ perfection, consistency and universality of the pattern in which these meanings are united."

Friday, College Hill, Clinton,N.Y.
December 10, 1943

Dear Richard: We'll look forward with great interest to the book, for as you know, the unifying spiritual truths underlying all men's thinking is a field that holds both Mildred's and my interest. Did I tell you last winter when we were together, how very useful to me an ancient Chinese poem (probably Taoist though it is anonymous) we came upon, had proved to be. Since it is presenting a mystery, it reveals more and more as the various pearls caught in it are found. Here it is-- and even if you've read it often before--I think a few days with it again might interest you up there where you are:

"It is so clear that it takes long to see.
You must know that the fire which you are seeking
Is the fire in your own lantern,
And that your rice has been cooked from the very beginning."

That any group could ever feel it had a monopoly on truth is exploded by this at the start, it seems to me-- for it throws the emphasis on "you" and "you" in the four-line poem is obviously any man and so all-men. And the challenge is the Quaker one-- and yet it goes back some four hundred years B.C. (for that is the age of this poem) ... the idea that no man can tell another what is best to light his way, but that if the man hunts within his own sphere, there is the light. I personally feel that the fire symbol is better than the inner-light one in many ways, for fire connotes that one even carries the source of light with him and also it connotes warmth as well as light. And the lantern-symbol connotes the light shining out of what we carry. It is a poem that truly takes into consideration the interdependence of unifying idea that the same spirit that is in one man is the same in another, and it is that same spirit that has been in other men in times past and will continue to be in others to follow-- and that a truth that lasts must be coming from a source that lasts... "from the very beginning" one's sustenance has been. I came upon "smaller than a grain of rice, smaller than a mustard seed" in one of the Indian writings that I found in Lin Yutang anthology (I forget which Upanishad) --and saw how this united the four-line poem above and the New Testament symbol of the mustard seed... both a grain of rice and of mustard seed appearing in there together. The sixth chapter of Matthew about food and raiment--and man not wasting himself in anxiety--is a longer way of saying that beautifully simple fourth line above: "And that your rice has been cooked from the very beginning." It doesn't even leave it growing in the fields--but actually shows the careful preparation for making "sustenance" for man-- it has been "cooked"... the loving care is so beautifully condensed in that line. It deals too with implications beyond the concrete words... Just as no man has ever seen "sustenance" or "force" (and as you pointed out in the FOR meditation--the "principle" and the "rules" remain in the chess-game no matter how we push the pegs around) -- it doesn't mean the "sustenance" or "forces" don't exist. So many scientists of the minor-technician sort would scoff (I've remembere from classrooms) at the real-beyond-the-apparent, yet not a one of them has ever seen, for example, a "gene" -- upon which all modern heredity and genetics (really evolution) is based. It all goes to show that words are simply an attempt to express the truth, but that the truth exists no matter how little of it we know or use. Just as love does. In the 13th century Eckhart kept explaining that you couldn't understand God except with the God-part of you-- which seems to be saying that no man can appreciate the Eternal or the eternal-verities except with the eternal-part of himself, or as the Quakers said with the divine-within.

over

Dante has a bit to say about feeling this understanding-spirit beating within him, the something that makes a synthesis of sense-impressions, that unites the "airy-head-knowledge" and the "heart-knowledge"... (that last is from Robert Barclay, 17th century Quaker)... Some of the modern Quakers seem to me to have missed the universal idea that the early Friends had...or that spoke-through-the-early-Friends...but among Friends there are some who do not tie on to Christianity anymore than to Buddhism-and-Hinduism, knowing that no one group has any monopoly on truth itself, that all are approximations and all contribute and through all groups and all men there is the same spirit speaking and moving... this life-spirit, which by its very nature, is not destructible, being life. As Coomeraswamy's book "The Transformation of Nature in Art" points out, we are making forms, creating them, and these forms are dissipated... (The newspapers always say of the forms men have built - "destroyed")... but it seems to me more and more that the continual flux and flow of materials into form is all part of the process -- but that nothing can be destroyed anymore than I could grind up a rock into bits and throw it out of the universe... an impossibilitity; all the properties each bit has would still be there, and the rock would still be in the universe... Just as the seasons change shows us each year that the compost heap sends back into the soil in different forms that which was there "in the beginning" and always was there and will be there... plus "the life caught in the forms"... People who refuse to do any imageless thinking because they don't know what it's all about and are frightened by the idea, I suppose, are still people who speak of values... And I was wondering a while back if it might not be clear to people on the verge of seeing the values of calm meditation of the contemplative sort, if they might not begin by considering that they'd be unwilling to have a photograph of themselves, no matter how good a photograph, labelled "a picture of your value"... This hits me as meaning something very important. So many people put such stress on others physiognomy and color etc. and on their own way-of-looking (the advertisements in our economic system where beautifying-the-person is held up so over-importantly has brought it about of course)... and yet a simple parable as this one about one's unwillingness to have the photograph labelled as "a picture of one's value" brings the more basic value back again, it seems to me... for it shows that imageless thinking is possible for anyone, for immediately, the person knows that his value can not be pictured, for he knows he is of some importance and that nothing tangible can actually catch that value-- yet that value exists. We grieve so much (mankind does) over bodies going, and it is sad and no amount of preparation keeps us from experiencing shock, but going back to this photograph theme-- In any family album are pictures of us at various ages, the child of seven going to school, the boy of fourteen going to summer camp, etc. and yet where are those bodies of the child of seven, the boy of fourteen, cellularly speaking? All the cells of the body, we're told, completely change by seven year cycles, and are dissipated and gone, all new ones left-- and we'd all think it foolish to grieve over these various bodies, we've each already lived in, and are no more in this form-- in each of our lives, we have so much evidence of the indestructibility of life, of the continuity..."from the very beginning"... etc. etc. etc. I'll stop...there is so much more this four-line poem does suggest to me as I've read it... it seems to say that we can not set up dividing lines and say the meaning of anything stops here, for all truths relate to all other truths of course...

I hope you enjoy reading this poem again-- and we'll be looking forward to receiving the book you're sending. Our love to Nonie and to you.

Your devoted,

Harper for us both

The Present

CANNOT all literature, and all our own remote experience, avail to teach us that the Today which seems so trivial, the task which seems so unheroic, the inexpressive blank look of the Present moment, * * * cannot all avail to teach us that these are wholly deceptive appearances, and that as soon as the irrecoverable Years have placed their Blue between these and us, these things shall glitter and attract us, seeming to be the wildest romance and—as far as we allow them in passing to take their own way and natural shape—the homes of beauty and poetry?

Ralph Waldo Emerson in his Journals. (Houghton Mifflin.)

* * *

Quote from "The Triumphant Spirit" by
E. Graham Howe. Faber & Faber, London

p. 54

"The effect of discarding the burden of individual responsibility when it is too heavy is somewhat similar, I think, to the occasion when the doctor enters the house to visit the patient. Stricken by some unknown disease, the sick one has been tossing and turning on his bed, with well-meaning but nervous relatives hovering anxiously around. The doctor's footsteps on the stairs has a quietening influence on the whole household, and it is as if a whisper goes round: 'Now we can leave it all to him!' The burden of coping with the problem has been passed over to more healthy and capable shoulders. It is not the patient's

job any more to carry the burden or to face the battle, and he is glad to give it up, leaving it to the doctor and his mysterious medicine. It may seem strange at first that this gesture of surrender, 'I give it up', contains so great a wealth of healing, but it is the essential ingredient of the mystery of 'faith' without which no patient can get well. It does not matter much whether the faith is in the doctor, or in the magic potion, or in the Vis Medicatrix Naturae, or in Winston Churchill, or in God. The thing that counts is that the Healer is not the same one who is sick. The patient must

surrender, and give up the effort of trying to cure himself. It is this attitude of self-surrender that starts the ball rolling back on to the road of health."

Quotes from an article on "William Richard Sorley 1855-1935", by Mark Fitzroy in The Adelphi for Jan-Mar, 1944.

"It is perhaps not inappropriate to mention here an important distinction which we must always bear in mind when thinking of Sorley or Eric Gill, or of their predecessors William Morris and Ruskin. These names have by now come to represent a definite 'movement' diametrically opposed to the whole modern industrial world; and with their counterparts in other countries - to name only four:

Gandhi, whose life was revolutionized by reading Ruskin's Unto this Last; Toynbee; Berdyaev; Giacomo Boni, who 'learned English in order to read Ruskin'; — they seem to me to be people with special, not to say peculiar, ideas. But to think of them thus is to see them in a completely false perspective. It is they who were ordinary, normal human beings, teaching in a world that was temporarily lost to reason what human beings had known since they first inhabited this earth. 'Following Moses, following Ruskin, following the universal practice of the world, except in exceptional periods such as that induced by our religious communalism' — (Eric Gill, Autobiography). ———

"He (Sutherland) will also be remembered as one of the most uncompromising and damaging

of the overwhelming modern sin of sham, a sin even more widely indulged in thirty years ago than it is now, when the influence of Selfridge, Gill and others can be seen in what we call 'modern' building, 'modern' furniture, 'modern' music; all of which are in reality simply the natural and undisguised productions of the machine age. But in Selfridge's day hypocrisy in the arts was almost as necessary as hypocrisy in politics ('our age is so complicated that we cheat quite unduly [L.]'), and he had to forget sham architectural 'styles' ("modern examples of 'Gothic' and 'classical' architecture are veiled or enormous formulations of nonsense; they are often works in the sham styles"), as well as sham Christianity ("I am

sham scandal the impossible.

understand the theory of atheism and I can understand the theory of Christianity, but I cannot understand the Christians of the marked fact ---- all sorts of defence are anti-Christian" [1]), slum education ("why are education and dead vacation so much alike? --- much of our education is gradgrinding in the ignorance of the World" [2]), slum living ("the rich are rich, the poor live" [3]), slum people ("in some crowds the only common thing one may be sure of is dirt!" [4]). Yet beside these numerous statistics there is something more, apparent as an underlying principle in all his work and teaching, which is of immediate and vital import and is very much typical of the chaotic heathenism of modern industrial barbarism with its remnant orgies of

planned number, as well as of that perpetual carnet before the donkey's nose, a planned paradise of luxurious slavery, happy licence, and total prevention. Selbsky himself described it as "the formation of taboos".

"The great architectures of the past had been noble autonomous ways of building, naturally developed by the craftsmen engaged in the actual works." And opposing to present-day possibilities: "He that would be a saint let him clean shoes and dig the earth." It is the traditional philosophy of human experience, known a hundred years ago in the mind of Ruskin, developed in our time by Morris and Selbsky, and culminating for the present in the life and

work of Eric Gill and others like Ananda Coomaraswamy and John Middleton Murry. Good work must be the fruit of a living tradition; i.e., it must be the product of continuous effort. The great and vital achievements of all past civilizations have been built on accumulated tradition applied in the spirit of the age to contemporary technique and materials. Conversely, if the opportunity for doing good work be withdrawn the human spirit withers and will eventually die. Hidden in Early Christian teaching are ideas which we have been of now. I remember a beautiful sculptured sarcophagus of the fourth century. In the first panel was represented the Fall by eating the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. In the next the Creation of Adam &

sheaf of corn and Eve a flint for spinning.
As the explanation of the illustration
says, these were to be the 'instruments
of their redemption.' (Toynbee Civilization,
p. 230).

"Today, in the western hemi-
sphere, the only large-scale occupation
developing on a live tradition is engin-
eering, as were responsible for nearly all
our major tools and utensils —
building, transport, entertainment, war,
clothes, even food. It is slave labour
for all but a few, and rightly regar-
ded the highest achievement of our
slave civilization. But the fact that
it is slave work means that the
normal and natural opportunity for
doing human work has been
withdrawn from those engaged on

the great achievements of the age just as effectively as it has been from those employed in the mass production of obsolete rubbish. Hence the unreal decay of human relationships and the enthronement of 'Sales the World'. And indeed - there is not precisely a common purpose in both sorts of production under our present dictatorships?. Is not money the moral motive and Mammon the great god? From the richest to the poorest how many many 'civilized' men work for any man except to get money? And having got enough money to feed, clothe and house our bodies, we want more money to pay someone else to do the slave work so

that we can be 'cultured' and enjoy 'leisure'. And having got enough 'leisure' to be thoroughly bored with life we then want still more money to pay still more people to provide our minds with gaseous amusements and our bodies with phallic sensations - until somebody with more business-sense steps in and provides a war. ----

"'If ever we are to remake civilization we shall have to begin by recognizing that it is founded first of all on labour, without which it cannot last a day. We must understand, and as it is so mighty a necessity, we must even learn to worship work ---- human work, I say, not machine grinding' (op. cit.). But modern slave-civilization or barbarism, is so

paramount and universal in the West, and is so rapidly forcing its poisonous materialism on the ancient, integral life of the East, that anything like a large revival of this human conception of work is out of the question. What, then, is to be done? 'If any man would be a saint, let him clean drains and dig the earth.' Forgo anything you possibly can which is dependent on slave-work, and get down yourself to some human work no matter how small a way so long as it is genuinely independent of the inhuman industrial system. Only do not think of it as a hobby, an adjunct to slavery, or as 'time off'. Put it in the centre of your life; let it be the way of your salvation, the road to your sainthood; and it is still

possible that others will follow your beginning and a new tradition of human work be gradually restored. Politicians and planners are only concerned with rearranging modern slavery. The rebirth of human living must come through the unceasing efforts of humble individuals and small communities who are prepared deliberately to sacrifice the enticements of modern systems in order to regain the 'instruments of their redemption.' ---

---- "A monk of, say, the eighth century, having laboured in the fields all day found that a little bird had built its nest in the mantle he had laid on the ground. Understanding what labour meant, he lent his cloak to the bird for the rest of the season." (4).

Some books by W.R. Lethaby

"Architecture, Mysticism & Myth – Percival & Co, 1892

London before the Conquest – Macmillan 1902

Medieval Art Duckworth 1904

Westminster Abbey & the Kings' Craftsmen –
Duckworth 1906

Form in Civilization (collected papers on art & labour)
Oxford U. P. 1922

Home and Country Arts (Published by 'Home & Country'
London) 1923

Westminster Abbey Reexamined – Duckworth 1925

Architecture: An Introduction to the History & Theory of
the Art of Building –

Philip Webb & his Work – Oxford U. P. 1935